來(lái)源: 時(shí)間:2023-09-21 閱讀:
分享
光華講壇——社會(huì)名流與企業(yè)家論壇第6578期
主題:Regulatory punishment in an oligopolistic market: Evidence from credit rating agencies寡頭市場(chǎng)中的監(jiān)管處罰:來(lái)自信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)的證據(jù)
主講人:麥考瑞大學(xué) 周青副教授
主持人:中國(guó)西部經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院 周凡副教授
時(shí)間:9月22日 10:30-12:00
舉辦地點(diǎn):柳林校區(qū)頤德樓H412
主辦單位:中國(guó)西部經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院 科研處
主講人簡(jiǎn)介:
Clara Qing Zhou,麥考瑞大學(xué)商學(xué)院應(yīng)用金融系,副教授,博士生導(dǎo)師。主要研究方向?yàn)閏orporate finance, climate finance和digital finance。多篇文章發(fā)表在Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Empirical Finance等。工作論文獲得AFAANZ Best Paper 2023,國(guó)際ESG論壇2023 Best Paper Award,和亞洲金融年會(huì)2021 Best Paper Award等。
內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介:
Regulatory punishment in the oligopolistic credit rating market is a delicate government intervention due to its potential high social cost. We exploit a unique feature of the Chinese bond market with a government-backed rating agency and explore a regulatory punishment on Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. Ltd. The intention behind this punishment is to improve the internal control and rating quality of credit rating agencies (CRAs). We show that the punishment has a short-term deterring effect on Dagong but worsens the quality of its ratings post-punishment. Less competitive rating agencies lower their ratings' quality, while highly reputable ones become more conservative. We highlight the potential unintended consequences on markets' competitive dynamics that regulators should consider when regulating oligopolistic markets.
在寡頭式信用評(píng)級(jí)市場(chǎng)中的監(jiān)管懲罰是一種因其潛在的高社會(huì)成本而需謹(jǐn)慎的政府干預(yù)。我們利用中國(guó)債券市場(chǎng)的一個(gè)獨(dú)特特點(diǎn),即有政府支持的評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu),并探討了對(duì)大公國(guó)際信用評(píng)級(jí)有限公司(Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. Ltd.)的監(jiān)管懲罰。這一懲罰的目的是改善信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)(CRAs)的內(nèi)部控制和評(píng)級(jí)質(zhì)量。我們表明,這種懲罰對(duì)大公國(guó)際信用評(píng)級(jí)在短期內(nèi)有威懾效應(yīng),但在懲罰后會(huì)使其評(píng)級(jí)質(zhì)量惡化。較不競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)降低了其評(píng)級(jí)質(zhì)量,而聲譽(yù)較高的評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)變得更加保守。我們強(qiáng)調(diào)了監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)在監(jiān)管寡頭式市場(chǎng)時(shí)應(yīng)考慮的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)動(dòng)態(tài)的潛在意外后果。